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Abstract
A binary win/loss model is constructed and estimated on the results from 1990-2004 contests
for open U.S. House seats. The results indicate that election outcomes are highly sensitive to
the major-party candidates’ campaign spending ratios, and increases in spending ratios are
shown to translate into non-trivial increases the candidate’s probability of winning, a result
that holds for both Republicans and Democrats. The payoff to high levels of spending
explains why it’s so attractive for candidates to outspend their opponents by large margins.
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I. Introduction 
     When incumbents seek re-election to the U.S. House of Representatives, they tend to 
outspend their opponents.  Federal Election Commission (FEC) data for the 2003-04 
election cycle show that incumbents outspent their opponents in all but four of the 400 U.S. 
House races in 2004 where an incumbent sought re-election.  The average incumbent spent 
$999,000 in seeking re-election, against $228,000 for the incumbent’s major-party general-
election opponent – a ratio of more than 4:1 in favor of the incumbent.
1   
     Incumbents seeking re-election also tend to win.  In the congressional election years from 
1998–2004, U.S. House incumbents seeking re-election have won 98% or more of the time.
2  
Consequently, it is unclear whether the spending is incidental or causal to victory.  Far more 
competitive are the races where no incumbent is on the ballot – the open-seat contests, 
which occur when incumbents retire or seek re-election, but lose in the primary, or when 
new districts are created following a reapportionment.  As such, a focus on open-seat races, 
which is the focus of the current study, serves to disentangle the link between spending and 
incumbency so that the spending effect is isolated.                               
     The present study also extends the research that has been done on open seat elections 
(see Gaddie, 1995; Gaddie and Bullock, 2000) by constructing a binary win-loss model that  
explores the salient issue of elections (i.e., victory/defeat).  In doing so, we examine open-
seat campaigns for the U.S. House using data from the elections of 1990 to 2004.  Also new 
in study, campaign spending for each open-seat race is modeled as a ratio, and relative 
spending (by major Party candidates) is then grouped into ranges.  A number of other 
explanatory variables such as party identification, and voting history are included as well.  
       
II. Literature Review 
     Though the literature on campaign spending and elections is extensive, relatively little of 
it has been devoted to open-seat contests.  Jacobson (1985) and Abramowitz (1988) reported 
separate sets of results for open-seat races and races involving an incumbent seeking re-
election – Jacobson for 1972-82 U.S. House races and Abramowitz for 1974-86 U.S. Senate 
races.
3  Both followed the usual approach of modeling candidates’ share of the two-party 
vote using Ordinary Least Squares.
4    Jacobson’s results were inconclusive, while 
                                                           
1 Further magnifying the incumbency spending advantage is the idea in Lott (1991: 91) that “more well known 
politicians [incumbents] may not have to spend very much to win.” 
2 The lack of serious competition faced by most incumbents seeking re-election has been widely noted in the 
political media, and there is a long history in the academic literature of attempts to explain it.  Additional 
studies that explain the incumbency advantages include, but are not limited to, Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977), 
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996, 1997 and 2003), and Levitt and Snyder (1997). 
3 Though both U.S. House and U.S. Senate races have been modeled, U.S. House races tend to be more 
popular for purposes of analysis because of the larger number of races contested in the House (435 versus 
approximately 33) in a given election year. 
4 Jacobson also reported a set of Two-Stage Least Squares results for the incumbent-challenger races.  
Abramowitz found that the candidates’ relative campaign spending and experience were the 
decisive factors.
5   
     Mondak (1993) and Flemming (1995) examined whether open-seat campaigns for the 
U.S. House exhibit a presidential coattail effect.  Both also modeled the two-party vote-share 
and estimated the model with OLS.  Mondak found that for the four presidential elections 
from 1976 to 1988, the impact of presidential coattails was greater in races for open seats 
than for seats where an incumbent was running.  Flemming obtained a similar finding from 
examining the five presidential elections from 1972 to 1992.  However, in only a few cases – 
less than 15% of the time – was the coattail effect found to be decisive.
6   
     Gaddie (1995) analyzed open-seat U.S. House contests from the standpoint of what was 
then the Democratic party’s control of the legislative body.  The two-party vote-share was 
modeled using OLS.  For 1982-92 open-seat U.S. House races, Gaddie found that 
Democratic candidates received a greater benefit than Republican candidates from previous 
experience in holding electoral office.  Democrats also benefited from the voting tendencies 
of sizable minority populations in the open-seat districts.  For spending, the results were 
reversed, with Republican candidates receiving a greater boost per $100,000 of spending 
than Democratic candidates.   
     The most comprehensive treatment of open-seat elections, focusing on U.S. House races, 
is provided by Gaddie and Bullock (2000).  Following the conventional approach, they 
modeled vote-share for open-seat House races from 1982 to 1998 using OLS.  Their model 
included variables for candidates’ spending, experience, presidential coattails and 
demographics.  Their findings mirrored those of Gaddie (1995), with Republicans receiving a 
slightly larger boost per $100,000 of spending than Democrats.  They also report a set of 
projected election outcomes for the hypothetical case where all 435 House seats became 
open in the election of 2000.  Their results indicated that if every seat were open, and if the 
presidential vote was split 50/50, the House chamber would break along the lines of a 55 
percent-to-45 percent majority favoring the Democrats. 
 
III. Model and Results 
As indicated above, the standard approach in this genre has been to model a candidate’s 
share of the two-party vote in the general election as a function of the candidate’s spending 
and the spending by the candidate’s opponent, along with other explanatory variables, and to 
estimate via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Nearly always, spending is found to be a key 
determinant of vote shares.  To test whether spending makes a difference – and how much 
of a difference – in open-seat elections, our model continues a recent trend of using 
alternative models.  In this case, a binary win-loss model of open-seat campaigns in the U.S. 
House is constructed and tested.
7  Our model follows the logistic (logit) distribution and 
takes the form, 
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5 The findings of Abramowitz were based on a relatively small sample size of only about 60 open seats in those 
U.S. Senate election years.  The U.S. House findings of Jacobson were from 301 open seats. 
6 Flemming included a spending variable, while Mondak did not. 
7 This approach follows general approach from the Caudill and Godwin (2002) and Caudill (2003) sports 
economics studies. 
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where RWIN is the binary dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, and 
β  is a vector of  parameters to be estimated. 
     The dependent variable in (1) above, RWIN, assumes a value of 1 if the Republican 
candidate won the general election, and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the Democratic candidate won 
the general election).  The candidate of interest is the Republican candidate.
8  The choice of 
the Republican candidate was dictated by the inclusion of a dummy variable for Republicans 
who ran in 1994, when Republicans regained control of the U.S. House.   
     Other campaign spending studies have modeled a candidate’s share of the vote (usually 
the two-party vote) rather than the win/loss outcome.  The rationale for so doing is that 
vote-share provides more information as the dependent variable.  Why opt for the win/loss 
outcome instead?  We argue that victory, not vote-share maximization, is the typical 
candidate’s goal.  Most serious candidates enter elections to win, not to maximize their vote 
share – especially the major-party candidates who win their party primaries and qualify for 
the general election.
9    The vote-share model makes no distinction between an extra five 
percent of the vote that runs up a candidate’s vote-share from 70 percent to 75 percent, and 
the five percentage points that separate 47 percent from 52 percent.  To the candidate, this 
distinction is of primary importance.  The win-loss model captures what is arguably the more 
salient issue – victory – rather than vote-share.
10 
     The win/loss outcome of each open-seat election is modeled as a function of a set of 
independent variables.  Each of the independent variables is also expressed in binary form.       
The key variable is relative campaign spending, which is represented by a seven-variable 
series of dummy variables.  The seven variables correspond to seven ranges for the ratio of 
spending by the Republican candidate to the Democratic candidate.  The ranges are < 0.25, 
0.25 – 0.49, 0.50 – 0.74, 0.75 – 1.33, 1.34 – 2.00, 2.01 – 4.00, and > 4.00.  If the spending 
ratio falls within one of those seven ranges, the variable for that range is assigned a value of 
1, and 0 otherwise.  In the logit model, 0.75 – 1.33 is the omitted range.  Note that the 
ranges are symmetric about the excluded range.
11   
     Two additional variables indicate whether the major-party candidates previously held 
elective office.  R EXPERIENCE takes a value of 1 if the Republican candidate had held 
elective office, and 0 otherwise.  Likewise, D EXPERIENCE was assigned a value of 1 if the 
Democratic candidate previously held elective office, and 0 otherwise.  We also include a 
                                                           
8 Jacobson (1985), Abramowitz (1988), and Flemming (1995) modeled the dependent variable as the percentage 
of the two-party vote received by the Democrats’ candidate, while Mondak (1993) modeled the share going to 
the Republicans’ candidate. 
9 Conceivably, it could be argued that some incumbents may pursue a strategy of vote-maximization in one 
election in the hopes of deterring challengers in future elections.  For those incumbents, running up the vote 
totals now might mean less likelihood of a serious challenger later on.  When it comes to the open-seat races, 
though, there’s no incumbent and no candidate enjoys that luxury. 
10 Politicians love football analogies, and legendary football coach Vince Lombardi has been famously quoted 
as saying, “winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing.”  As famous as the quote is, it is actually misquoted in 
this passage.  What Lombardi said was, “winning isn’t everything, but making the effort to win is.” 
11 The bottom ratio is the reciprocal of the top ratio, the number-two ratio is the reciprocal of the number-six 
ratio, and the number-three ratio is the reciprocal of the number-five ratio.  While the symmetry in the 
spending series in a nice feature, and the logit model is appropriate for identifying diminishing (or negative) 
marginal returns to campaign spending, we are unable to interpret any results on marginal returns because the 
spending bin ranges are not all of equal size.  In particular, the outer bins – where either the Republican or 
Democrat is outspent by more than 4:1 – include everything from the 4:1 cutoff all the way to zero (infinity).  
The ranges for the interior bins are much smaller.  These particular bins were used because they resulted in 
equal (roughly) numbers of observations and each bin contained Republicans who both won and lost. 
3 
variable that reflects the district’s recent voting history, capturing any carry-over effects from 
the district’s identification with the seat’s previous occupant.  R SEAT is assigned a value of 
1 if the seat had been occupied by a Republican, and 0 otherwise.   
     The existence of a presidential-election coattail effect is captured by the variable, TOP-
OF-TICKET.  In presidential-election years, it assumes a value of 1 if the U.S. House 
candidate was identified with the party of the presidential candidate who received the most 
votes in that district, and 0 otherwise.  This permits a coattail effect even from a losing 
presidential candidate.  For example, in the presidential election of 1996, the home-state 
candidacy of Senator Robert J. Dole may have boosted the Republican turnout in Kansas, 
even though Dole lost the presidential election to William J. Clinton.  The stimulus to the 
Republican turnout may, in turn, have helped Republican candidates for that state’s U.S. 
House seats.  The coattail variables in Mondak (1993) and Flemming (1995) reflected 
identification with the winning presidential candidate.
12 
     The remaining two variables are 1994 GOP and NEW DISTRICT.  The former captures 
the effect of the Republican landslide election of 1994.  It assumes a value of 1 for all 1994 
observations on Republican party candidates, and 0 otherwise.  NEW DISTRICT is assigned 
a value of 1 for elections involving a newly created Congressional produced by a recent U.S. 
Census and for the gerrymandering-related instances of redistricting that occurred in Texas 
in 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
     The model was tested on data from the eight U.S. House election years, from 1990 to 
2004.
13  Those eight elections include four presidential elections and four mid-term elections.  
The election results for each open-seat race were taken from the official records maintained 
by the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives.
14  The candidates’ spending 
totals and other characteristics were retrieved from The Almanac of American Politics. 
     The maximum-likelihood estimates from the logit model are presented in Table 2.  All six 
of the spending-ratio variables are statistically significant.  As expected, the coefficients are 
negative for the variables with ratios of less than one (i.e., when the Republican candidate 
was outspent), and positive for the variables with ratios of greater than one (i.e., when the 
Republican candidate outspent the Democratic candidate).  It is also encouraging to note 
that the campaign spending variables series exhibits the expected monotonic trend, 
suggesting that larger spending ratios yield a payoff in terms of a higher probability of 
victory. 
     The results also suggest that even when the top-spending candidate is already 
outspending the other by a significant margin, additional spending continues to increase, by 
non-trivial increments, that candidate’s probability of victory.  Republican candidates who 
outspend their opponents by a ratio of greater than 4:1, versus a ratio of between 2:1 and 
4:1, raised their probability of winning by an additional 7.4 percentage points.
15  Conversely, 
when Democratic candidates outspend their opponents by a ratio of greater than 4:1, versus 
a ratio of between 2:1 and 4:1, or when the Republican spend less than 25 percent as much 
                                                           
12 One might also argue that TOP-OF-TICKET captures the congruence between the candidate’s party and the 
partisanship of the district.  
13 Again, election counts are shown (for each election cycle) in Table 1.  The lack of campaign spending by one 
candidate in 22 of these 371 open-seat races necessitated omission of these 22 observations.   
14 Those records are available at www.clerk.house.gov. 
15 The analysis here assumes that the political variables (i.e., R EXPERIENCE, D EXPERIENCE, R SEAT, 
TOP-OF-TICKET, 1994 GOP, and NEW DISTRICT) are held at their mean values, while the spending series 
variables not under consideration are restricted to zero.  The means for the political variables are drawn from 
the original 371 observations. 
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as the Democrat, instead of between 25 percent and 50 percent, the Republicans’ probability 
of victory is 18.3 percentage points lower.  This suggests that additional spending by the top-
spending candidate – Republican or Democratic – continues to yield a non-trivial payoff in 
terms of the probability of victory.   
     The results above show that when Republicans outspend Democrats, additional spending 
by Republicans has a smaller effect than additional spending by Democrats when Democrats 
outspend Republicans.  Republicans’ chances of victory rise when they outspend Democrats, 
but they fall by more when the tables are turned and Democrats outspend Republicans by 
similar margins.  This may have to do with spending and turnout.  As a general rule, low-
turnout elections favor Republicans and high-turnout elections favor Democrats.  It follows 
that higher levels of spending by Democratic candidates would have the potential to yield a 
greater boost to their chances of victory than higher spending by Republican candidates.          
     While similar regressors for Republicans’ and Democrats’ experience were found by 
Gaddie and Bullock (2000) to have coefficients that were statistically significant, their results 
were based on the 1982-1998 open-seat races.  The coefficients on the two experience 
variables in our model (R EXPERIENCE and D EXPERIENCE) displayed the expected 
signs.  However, unlike the Gaddie and Bullock (2000) results, evidence from the 1990-2004 
open-seat races presented here indicates that prior experience in elective office is not 
statistically significant.        
     The variable that related to the district’s recent voting history, R SEAT was statistically 
significant.  Republicans who were running for seats whose last occupant had been a 
Republican could, ceteris paribus, expect a 21.6 percentage point greater probability of victory 
than Republicans not in this category.
16  This suggests that the open-seat’s recent party 
identification is an important characteristic (i.e., voters vote their party identification).   
     The statistically significant coefficient on the TOP-OF-TICKET variable indicates that 
presidential elections have a sizable coattail effect on open-seat elections.  Open-seat U.S. 
House candidates from the same party as the presidential candidate who won that U.S. 
House district could expect a 26.1 percentage point increase the probability of winning vis-à-
vis candidates not in this category, ceteris paribus.
 17  Victorious presidential candidates usually 
see their party gain seats in Congress.
18  The effect held regardless of whether or not the 
presidential candidate who won a particular U.S. House district was also the Electoral 
College winner. 
     The impact of national political trends is evident in the statistically significant coefficient 
on the 1994 G.O.P. variable.  Candidates running as Republicans in 1994, when the G.O.P. 
regained control of both houses of Congress, enjoyed a considerable advantage.  The result 
shows that Republicans running for open-seats in 1994 could expect a 30 percentage point 
greater probability of winning than other Republicans, all else equal.
 19  Republicans won 38 
of the 51 (i.e., 74.5 percent) open-seats that were at stake in the U.S. House elections of 
1994.  Finally, no effect was found for new U.S. House districts that were created following a 
census (i.e., the coefficient on NEW DISTRICT is not statistically significant). 
     As pointed out above, our sample of open seat races includes races in districts whose 
lines were redrawn to reflect the Censuses of 1990 and 2000, and in 2004 Texas, where 
                                                           
16 This estimate is obtained with the campaign spending variables set to zero, and the political variables (other 
than R SEAT) held at their respective means. 
17 This estimate was obtained using the same procedure above for R SEAT. 
18 Republicans gained seven U.S. House seats when President George W. Bush was re-elected in 2004. 
19 This estimate was obtained using the same procedure above for R SEAT. 
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districts were redrawn by a Republican Congressional majority in order to reverse past 
Democratic gerrymandering in that state.
20  Because Congressional redistricting could 
potentially impact our analysis of open seats election outcomes beyond the ability of NEW 
DISTRICT to capture that potential impact, whether the redistricting is the result of 
gerrymandering or was simply required due to the results of a recent Census, we considered 
(below) a version of our model that omits both the 1992 and 2002 data for open seats 
contests in the new House districts that emerged from the 1990 and 2000 Census results, 
and all of the 2004 data for Texas.
21  These results are shown in Table 3 below. 
     As indicated by Table 3, the exclusion of the data reflecting states’ redistricting efforts, 
along with the variable NEW DISTRICT, has little effect on the other regressors in our 
model.  All six of the regressors in the spending ratios series retain the same signs as in the 
Table 2 results, and again they are all significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  
Additionally, RSEAT, TOP-OF-TICKET and 1994 GOP all retain positively signed 
coefficients, and each is significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.  These results also 
replicate those shown in Table 2, suggesting that any impact on our main results that is due 
to redistricting is minor at best. 
 
IV. Concluding Comments 
While open seats comprise only a small fraction – on average about 10 percent – of the U.S. 
House seats that are at stake every two years, they represent a disproportionate share of the 
party turnover.  Between 1998 and 2004, more party turnover occurred in the 142 open-seat 
races than in the other 1,598 races where incumbents sought re-election.  With 98 percent of 
House incumbents now winning their re-election bids, open seat contests arguably provide a 
more fertile area for examining the impact of spending on election outcomes.   
     The results from estimating a binary win/loss model on open-seat elections data from 
1990-2004 for the U.S. House indicate that those elections’ outcomes are highly sensitive to 
candidates’ spending ratios.  When one candidate outspends another by 1.33 times or more, 
that candidate enjoys a higher probability of victory.  Still higher spending ratios translate 
into non-trivial increases in the candidate’s probability of winning, a result that holds for 







                                                           
20 Redistricting outside of Census years, as in 2004 Texas, provides state legislatures with an opportunity to 
revamp the partisanship of a state’s U.S. House delegation.  The 2004 redistricting in Texas resulted in seats 
previously held by Democrats falling into Republicans’ hands. 
21 We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for suggesting that we consider this alternative 
empirical model. 
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Table 1: Open Seats in U.S. House Elections, 1990-2004 










































Table 2: Logit Model Results: Base Sample 
 
Term Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant -0.666  0.449 
< 0.25  -2.940*  0.671 
0.25 – 0.49  -1.587*  0.515 
0.50 – 0.74  -1.479*  0.437 
1.34 – 2.00  1.165*  0.514 
2.01 – 4.00  1.324*  0.572 
> 4.0  2.266*  0.783 
R EXPERIENCE  0.469  0.338 
D EXPERIENCE  -0.215  0.313 
R SEAT  0.972*  0.327 
TOP-OF-TICKET 1.301*  0.402 
1994 GOP  1.722*  0.457 
NEW DISTRICT  0.374  0.557 
N = 349 
Model χ
2 = 201.36* 
              Note: Coefficients significant at 95% confidence level denoted 





























Table 3: Logit Model Results: New District Observations Omitted 
 
Term Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant -0.759  0.460 
< 0.25  -2.656*  0.696 
0.25 – 0.49  -1.687*  0.566 
0.50 – 0.74  -1.559*  0.460 
1.34 – 2.00  1.246*  0.558 
2.01 – 4.00  1.194*  0.589 
> 4.0  1.974*  0.798 
R EXPERIENCE  0.528  0.352 
D EXPERIENCE  -0.196  0.328 
R SEAT  0.994*  0.331 
TOP-OF-TICKET 1.572*  0.427 
1994 GOP  1.776*  0.458 
    
N = 310 
Model χ
2 = 173.95* 
              Note: Coefficients significant at 95% confidence level denoted 
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